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THANK YOU SIR, MAY I HAVE ANOTHER; THE ISSUE OF
THE UNSUSTAINABILITY OF LOW INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDITS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
John Baber*

I.

Introduction

The Federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (L1HTC) program is
currently the nation's largest federal subsidy for the development and
rehabilitation of affordable housing,l having created or preserved
over 2.5 million housing units and distributed over $7.5 billion in federal tax credits to developers of and investors in affordable housing
from the program's inception in 1986 through 2007.2 Howevcr, despite its monumental size and impact, the program has some potentially fatal flaws that threaten the long-term financial and physical
viability of the very affordable housing that it creates, and threatens
the health of the neighborhoods that it is created in.~ Affordable
housing projects built today are routinely constructed in communities
that are already geographically segregated, overburdened with debt
due to unnecessarily high up-front development fees and other debts,
and simultaneously limited in the amount of rental income they can
generate. 4
In many ways, these building practices do not benefit the communities they are built in, and can lead to an unsustainable economic situation whcJ'e the project's ability to fund its ongoing maintenance and
capital improvements (new roof'), systems, etc.) are put in serious
jeopardy because most of its revenue goes towards paying its operating
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Megan Ballard, Profiting from Poverty: The Comj)elilion Betwun For-Profit and
NonproJit Developers for Low Income Hou~ing Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L:J. 211,
212 (2003).
NAT'l COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, STATE HFA FACTBOOK: 2010
NCSHA ANNUAL SURVEY RESULTS 92, 100 (2012).
See irifra Part IV.
See Barry Zigas, Learning from the Low Income Housing Tax Credit: Building a
New Socia/Investment Mode~ 9 CMTY. DEV. INV. REv. 47, 54 (2013). Zigas
states that ~there is considerable value "leakage" caused by layers of sponsors, syndicators, lawyers, accountants, and others needed t.o create, track,
and document the credit." Id.
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expenses and pre-existing debt. 5 Remarkably the state-run system of
administering the LIHTC and the federal tax credit statute it"elf, allows, and in some ways, indirectly encourages developers to construct
affordable housing projects in already segregated communities. 6 Furthennore, while these projects have a good shot at short-term profitability for the developers, they have a slim chance of being able to
financially support themselves in the long-term - much to the detriment of the tenants who live there and the communities in which the
projects are located. 7
This article will focus on. the issues that arise in the administration
of the LIHTC in the State of Maryland. Part II of this paper will review the history of the LIHTC program and identify the defining features of the program - some of which are at the heart of the
program's problems. 8 Part III will identify how this program works in
Maryland - from its state-specific requirements to its application and
administration. 9 Part N will address some ofthe problematic issues in
the LIHTC program: how the allocation of the tax credits has not
alleviated geographic segregation, and how some of the program's key
features have been misapplied by both private developers and governmental interests to the point that the program's central mission is no
longer being adequately fulfilled. 10 Finally, Part V will offer some suggestions for ways to improve the long-term financial prospect." of the
atfordable housing constructed under the program, including private/non-profit and private/governmental partnerships that will
strengthen the program. l !
Like most federal government programs, the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit program has gone through a full maturation cycle in the
years since its inception, and looks much different today than it did
when it was createa almost thirty years ago.l~ In order to find out
where the program should be headed, it is first necessary to see from
where it came.

5. See infra Part IV.S.C.
6. SeeThe Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 26 U.S.c. § 42 (2006); Md. QT~ali
jied Allocatiun Plan for the Allocatiun of Fed. Low Income Housing 'Fax Credits,
MD. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND CMIT. DEV. Gul. 8, 2014), http://www.dhcd
.maryland.gov/Websitc/ programs/ rhf/Documen ts/MD_ QAPJuly_8_2014
.pdf [hereinafter QAP].
7. See infra Part N.
8. &e infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part N.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See generally William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Model,
2002 WIS. L. REv. 377, 396-98 (2002) (discussing the evolution of the fcderal Urban Renewal program, Community Action Program, and the rise of
state-run Public Housing Authorities).
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The History and Purpose of the LIHTC Program

Federal and state governments have "been in the business of providing subsidized rental housing since the mid-1930's."13 Government
has used a multitude of programs to address housing affordability issues over the last century, from directly providing aflordable housing
with the public housing programs of the 1930's-60's,14 to direct renter
subsidies with the Section 8 rental assistance program in the 1970's.15
In the mid-1980's, Congress turned to private housing developers to
facilitate the creation of affordable housing when it enacted the
LIHTC program as part of the comprehensive Tax Reform Act of
1986. 10
The LIHTC program has somewhat loose requirements at the federal level; because the hallmark of the program is that it is to be administered by state housing agencies. 17 "The federal government
allocates LlHTC program credits annually to each state based on population,"18 and administers the distribution of the credits through the
Treasury Department. J9 In 2010, the federal government made available $2.10 per capita worth of tax credits for each state, totaling $12
million available to Maryland. 20
The tax credits are distributed as a whole to state "allocating agencies" (which usually are states' housing finance agencies), leaving the
decision about how to specifically distribute the tax credits to the individual states. 21 Each designated state allocating agency must create
and act pursuant to a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) that is used to
distribute the tax credits, giving preference to projects serving the lowest income tenants. 22 The QAP creates an orderly method by which
13. Ballard, supra note 1, at 212.
14. See Zigas, supra note 4, at 48.
15. Id. See also Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1706(e) (l974) (current version at 42 U.s.C. § 1437(f) (2014).
16. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 101 Stat. 2189 (1986)
(current version at 26 U.S.C. § 42).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 42.
18. Kimberly C. Moore, The Federal Low-lncome Housing Tax Credit Program: 25
Years of Public-PriVltle Partnerships, PERSPECTIVES ON REAL ESTATE NEWSLETTER
(Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP), Summer (2011).
19. Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community RcvitaUzation: Applying the
Fai:r Housing Act to the Low-lncome Housing Tax Credit Program, 58 VANO. L.
REv. 1747, 1777 (2005).
20. Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-2 C.D. 617. In 2010, Maryland distributed over $9
million to ten affordable housing projects. See 2010 Recipient List, MD. DEPT.
or Hous. & CM1Y. DEV., http://dhcd.maryland.gov/Website/progra.ms/
lihtc/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
21. Marc Smith & Anne Williamson, The Low income Housing 'Tax Credit and inner-City Revitali'l.ation, 35 Hous. & SOC'y 129, 131 (2008). "The LIHTC program requires substantial state or local government action." Florence
Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit
Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011,1014 (1997).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (m)(l)(A)(ii).
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developers can submit applications and ultimately compete for the tax
credits by articulating the selection criteria by which projects are chosen and the procedure used to monitor ongoing compliance with the
program's requirements.2~ This allows states to use the federal tax
credits to create and implement policies that directly address a state's
specific housing needs, all with minimal federal interference. 24
Most of the specifics of how the LIHTC program works are determined at the state level. The next section explains how the LIHTC
program is administered at the state level in Maryland, why it is so
desirable for developers, and how it facilitates the creation of affordable housing.

III.
A.

How the LIHTC Program Works
How Tax Credits Fund the Development of Affordable Housing

LIHTCs are essentially a development trade-off: a public subsidy
that can be applied directly to the building costs of a project in exchange for a dedicated amount of affordable housing units in that
project. 25 The affordable units are then rent-restricted and subject to
income limitations that ensure low-income tenants have the opportunity to live in these units. 26 These tax credits "attract capital to an
investment that is otherwise not attractive or economically desirable,"
and allow for affordable housing to be built even if the pr~ject's finances are tight. 27
The main benefit of the tax credit program to developers is that
there is a ready market of investors that are familiar with the product
and willing to purchase credits, resulting in substantially lower permanent deht on project.. than otherwise could be achieved. The state
can issue tax credits to a project developer with an annual value of up
to nine percent of the total cost of the development project, excluding the land costs, which is available to investors over a period of ten
years, totaling 70 percent of the total qualified basis of the building. 28
The qualified basis of the building is the total development cost of
that portion of the building that will qualify for LIHTCs, induding
developer fees, but minus land costs. 29
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

ld.
See Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 131.
Roisman, supra note 21, at 1014.
ld.
Zigas, supra note 4, at 50.
See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (b) ([ )(A); QAP, supra note 6, at 2; Zigas, supra note 4, at
49.

29.

MD. DEPT. OF Hous. & CM"IY. DEV., MULTIFAMII.Y RENTAL FIN. PROGRAM
GUIDE: ATTACHMENT TO MD. QUAL/FlED ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE ALLOCA·
TION OF FEDERAL Low INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT:; 32 (2013) [hereinafter Program Guide).
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For federal income tax purposes, LIHTCs are used to offset the
taxes that for-profit taxpayers would otherwise owe on unrelated
earned income, "dollar for dollar" and are not mere "deductions"
from gross income. 3o Developers "sell" such credits by permitting forprofit taxpayers, usually corporations, to become investor/owners in
the entity that owns a LlHTC-eligible project in return for a muchneeded cash infusion of capital into that entity that can help to make
a financially difficult project possible. 31 Once the prqject is completed the "tax credits begin to flow to the investors who purchased
them."32
The main benefit of the tax credit to the public is that it requires a
developer to dedicate a set amount of rent-restricted units per project
for tenants who meet certain low-income requirements. 33 Federal law
requires specific income limits for the set-aside units: either 20 percent of the total units in a project must be occupied by tenant.." earning 50 percent or less of the Area Median Income (AMI) (known as a
20/50 split) or at least 40 percent of the unit.'; must be occupied by
tenant.'; earning 60 percent or less of the AMI (known as a 40/60
split).34 The rent~ for the units are established by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) annually,
based on the number of bedrooms in a unit, and may not exceed 30
percent of the income ceiling. 35 A developer must commit to maintaining compliance with these rent restrictions for a minimum of 30
years (subject to earlier termination as discussed later in this article),
although states are allowed to dictate longer terms.36 The United
States Internal Revenue Code (the Code) requires that each project's
affordability restrictions be recorded in an "extended low-income
housing commitment" (often called a "Land Use Restriction Agreement").~7 Currendy, Maryland requires an additional 10 years of rent
restrictions, for a total of forty years, but permits an owner to opt-out
of the program restrictions after 15 years if there is a buyer willing to
pay an above market-rate purchase price that must be approved by the
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD).38 In
practice, this provision effectively prevents any project from leaving
the program after 15 years.
30. Roisman, supra note 21, at 1014-15,
31. fd.
32, Ballard, supra note 1, at 219,
33. Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Justin Marion, The Lyjects oj" Low income Housing
Tax Credit Developments on Neighborhoods, 93 J. 01'- PUB. ECON. 654, 660
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

(2009) .
26 V.S.c. § 42 (g)(1)-(2).
See QAP, supra note 6, at 2.
Orfield, supra note 19, at 1777,
Zigas, supra note 4, at 51.
See QAP, supra note 6, at 2,
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The QAP: How Tax Credits are Administm-ed by the State

The creation of the QAP is a multi-step process where private interests, elected officials, and members of the pubJic help to shape Maryland's procedure for allocating LIHTC. 39 Each state is required to
create a QAP,40 which in Maryland is created by the DHCD, along
with public input, and amended yearly as necessary, after an opportunity for public comment and a public hearing. 41 The final draft of the
amended QAP is then submitted to the Governor for approvalY Mter the approval of the QAP, the DHCD, designated as the agency that
distributes the tax credits, monitors ongoing compliance with the
state and federal requirements of the program - most importantly
that a particular project maintains the minimum required percentage
of affordable units for the agreed upon period of time. 43
The QAP is used to promulgate the housing priorities that the state
deems appropriate from time to time, be it elderly housing, housing
for people with disabilities, or low-income family housing. 44 The QAP
does this by outlining the process and procedures by which the DHCD
will choose among all the competing development proposals, both by
articulating the minimum requirements that all applicants must meet,
induding "site requirements, developer experience, and other measures of pruject quality" and by giving higher priority to various elements of the development process. 45
This is done by constructing a ratings system that allocates various
numbers of points to elements of the development process, project
location, project design and services proposed to be delivered to residents, and awarding LIHTCs to those proposals with the highest
number of points. This approach allows the state a large amount uf
flexibility to use the federal tax credits to address its specific housing
issues, because it can make state housing policy objectives the thresh~
old standards to meet when developers compete for the tax credits. 4fi
However, the process of formulating the QAP's standards by the
DHCD can also be ripe for "backroom dealing," developer lobbying,
and political intrigue that favor certain- projects or policies over
others.47
39. Roisman, supra note 21, at 1014; QAP, supra note 6, at 3.
40. 26 U.S.C. §42 (m)(l)(A)(i).
41. See QAP, supra note 6, at 3. The DHCD gives at least 14 days notice to the
public that a public hearing will be held, and accepts public comments in
writing up until the date or the hearing. fd.
42. Id.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
44. Zigas, supra note 4, at 52.
45. Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 133.
46. Jd.
47. See infra Part IV. "For-profit developers ... may also succeed in altering stateimposed preferences or set-asides in QAPs." Ballard, supra note 1, at 24142.
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For example, politicians may find that their constituents have a
need for more elderly housing or for more housing for persons with
disabilities, and can request t.hat the DHCD make those particular
housing needs a priority in the next QAP, which can give a developer
who pledges to build that particular type of housing a competitive
edge in the ranking process over developers who apply to build family
housing. Or an interest group, like the construction industry, can
lobby for more priority to be given to new construction projects over
the rehabilitation of existing buildings, because new construction may
be more profitable for builders. In both of these situations, "the annual development of the QAP is a crucially important advocacy opportunity" that can shape who benefits from the allocation of the year's
supply ofLIHTCs. 48 Since the QAP sets the rules by which all competitors must play, the yearly review and amendment process of the QAP
is a prime opportunity for many interest groups to help shape how,
and to whom, the next year's allotment of tax credits are distributed. 49
One way this is done is by influencing what criteria are induded in the
QAP, and the number of points associated with each "Competitive
Scoring Criteria."5o
The QAP scores each pr~ject application according to certain criteria, where each criterion has a certain point value assigned to it, with a
maximum total score of 200 points ..'"'] The DHCD then ranks the proposed projects based on the overall score of the application, and distributes the tax credits to the highest scoring projects. 52 One
important criterion is the physical location of the proposed development. 53 The location of affordable housing developments can help
further a state's mission to deconcentrate poverty, improve urban
housing stock, or jump-start economic development in a targeted
area. 54 Two "priority project categories" in Maryland are "Family
Housing in Communities of Opportunity" (Communities of Opportunity) and "Community Revitalization and Investment Areas" (Revitalization Areas).!;:>
A project receives a large amount of the total points allotted to the
location of a proposed development by building their housing in a
Community of Opportunity zone, i.e. a suburban area, or a Revitalization Area, i.e. a depressed urban area. Communities of Opportunity
are described by the QAP as having good schools, high homeowner48. Florence Wagman Roisman, Poverty, Discrimination, and the Low-income Hous·
ing Tax Credit Program, IND. UNIV. ROBERT H. MCKlNNEY SCH. OF u..w (Nov.
2000), http://lllckinneyla w.iu.ed u/ instructors/ roisman/lih tcmemo. pdf.
49. Jd.
50. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 47.
5l. See infra Appendix.
52. See: infra Appendix.
53. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 56.
54. Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 133.
55. Program Guide, mpra note 29, at 13.
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ship rates, low poverty rates, low property vacancy rates, low unemployment rates, and school systems with high standardized test scores
and graduation rates. 56 Generally, these suburban areas are less
densely populated and have less dense zoning in many areas than
their urban counterparts, although their land costs may be higher.
In contrast, Revitalization Area<; are described by the QAP as being
located within either a Qualified Census Tract or federally designated
Difficult to Develop Area, which are both areas that have significant
levels of poverty and other economic challenges. 57 A Qualified Census Tract is an area designated by the Secretary of HUD where, according to the most recent census data, 50 percent or more of the
households have an income less than 60 percent of the AMI, or an
area that has at least a 25 percent poverty rate. 58 Generally, these urban areas have much higher concentrations of minority residents than
their suburban counterparts, and many times have underperforming
school systems with low standardized test scores and graduation
rates:~Y However, both Communities of Opportunity and Revitalization Areas come with their own development and social challenges,
which is discussed in Part IV.A.
A project proportionally receives the largest amount of points based
on the experience of its development team. uO The determining factor
is the financial viability of the development company and the company's track record during the previous five years with comparable
housing projects. u • This scoring criterion may reflect the desire of the
DHCD to have stable development partners, but it may also stifle new
companies who are unable to compete with the financial strength and
performance of a few favored developers. However, given the relative
complexity of successfully competing for the LlHTC and properly
renting up and managing those projects after completion, "successful
developers are those with experience and the capital to be able to
withstand lengthy appEcation review periods and compliance monitoring .'equirement".,,62
The QAP has general requirement.;; concerning the services a project should provide its residents, but it does not articulate how those
services should be delivered. It mandates that projects funded in Ma56. [d. at 14-16.
57. rd. at 16; 26 U.S.c. § 42 (d) (5)(B).
58. Philip Tegeler, Megan Haberle, & Ebony Gayles, Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing in HUD Housing Program~: A First Term Report Card, 22]. AFFORDABLE
HouslNC & CM'lY. DEV. L. 27, 59 (2013) (citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 42(d)(5)(B) (ii)).
59. Seema Ramesh Shah, Harling !~ow Income Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plans
Take Into Account the 0wlity oj Schools at Proposed Family Housing Sites: A Partial An.~wer to the &sid.ential Segregation Dilemma?, 39 IND. L. REv. 691, 711
(2006).
60. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 50,
61. ld.
62. Smith & Williamson, supra note 21, at 134.
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ryland must provide services "appropriate to the population served by
the project," which is reinforced by specific scoring criteria. fi3 Obviously, elderly and special-needs housing requires some specialized services which can raise the overall operating cost of the project, but
even family projects must provide "passive links to appropriate community services for tenants" that will improve the "residents' ability to
uphold their lease obligations" and "enhance the quality of life."64
Typical community services include on-site debt counseling, job
training programs, child care, food programs, and supplementary
transportation (a bus that connects the property to a local transportation hub). However, no charge can be imposed on residents for these
services, which create extra operating costs for the pr~jects and can
lead to increasing financial distress and the potential for default on
the project's debt.
Finally, substantial fees may be included in the· total development
cost of the project: fees for developers, architects, contractors, lawyers,
and more. These fees may only be paid from equity or cash flow from
the property itself. 65 The project developer usually has his fee disbursed over the a period of several years, depending on the limitations imposed by LIHTC investors: Le. 25 percent at the closing of the
deal, 25 percent after "substantial completion," and the remaining 50
percent after the project is totally complete. fi6 In many cases, construction cost overruns, slower than expected occupancy and/ or conversion of construction to permanent loans at lower dollar amounts
cause some portion of the development fee to be unpaid at completion and paid from project cashflow over time thereafter. Part N will
discuss the issues of how key aspects of the program's scoring criteria
encourages developers to build in already poor areas instead of
spreading the projects out across a region, and how a high developer's
fee can be a primary threat to the long-term financial viability of a
project where it effectively eats up any additional operating income
that could be saved for capital improvements. 57

N.
A.

Problems With the Program
The Overdevelopment oj "Revitalization Areu5" has led to Increased Geographic Segregation

The way the QAP is currently written financially entices developers
to build 100 percent low-income housing in already poor, urban
neighborhoods, which exacerbates the existing geographic segregation in those neighborhoods. Many developers find that urban areas
63. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 26.
64. ld. at 26-27.
65. ld. at 83.
66. See id. at 83.
67. See infra Part IV.
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are lucrative locations in which to build, evidenced by the fact that
over 50 percent of all tax credit properties are built in such areas. 68
There are usually lower land costs, and the QAP also builds in a pretty
substantial incentive: a project built in a Qualified Census Tract is eligible to receive a 30 percent bonus in their qualified basis. 6Y This
means that if a pr~ject qualifies for the "basis boost," the total LIHTCr
eligible costs of the project are deemed to be increased by 30 percent
for t.he purposes of allocating the LIHTCs, thereby resulting in 30%
additional tax credits on which cash can be raised. 70 A side effect of
the "basis boost" is the increased financial attractiveness of urban areas as the building site of choice Jor LIHTC pr~jects, which continues
to perpetuate racial and economic segregation in these areas. 71
Land costs can be higher in suburban areas, and it can be difficult
to find a piece of property suitable to building a multifamily project
since much of the land eit.her must be rezoned for multi-family housing or is not convenient to public transportation. Furthermore, the
QAP includes a provision where a developer must seek local community approval for a proposed tax credit project or risk the fC:;jection of
its application by the DHCD.72 This allows community groups opposed tu the development of affordable housing in their neighborhood to frustrate the creation of that housing. 7~ While the power to
veto a proposed development is available to communities in both urban and suburban areas, communities in suburban areas are typically
the ones that oppose the expansion of affordable housing in their
neighborhoods. 74 "These [local approval] pruvisions ... lead to a concentration of such housing in areas with higher poverty levels."7~
Additionally, although federal law requires a minimum percentage
of the units in each project be occupied by persons with certain maximum income limits for the set-aside units (i.e., the 20/50 or 40/60
68. See Roisman, supra note 21, at 1020.
69. See QAP, supra note 6, at 10; Karen Horn & Katherine O'Regan, The Low
Inwme Housing Tax Credit and Racial Segregation, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL Es.TATE & URBAN POLlCY (May 2, 2011), http://furmancenler.org/files/publications/LlHTC_Analysis_RaciaLSegregation_Final_aILpdf.
70. See supra not.e 28 and accompanying text.
71. See Shah, supra note 59, at 712-13.
72. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 7.
73. See id. "[Wlhen residents engage in 'NIMBYIsm,' local officials will likely
follow suit." J. William Callison, Achieving OUT Country: Geographic Desegregation and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 19 S. CALIF. REV. OF I.. &JUSTICE
213, 256 (2010).
74. See AJison Knezevich, Baltimore County Council Rejects Low-lncome Housing Pm·
ject, BALTIMORJ::; SUN (Nov. 18, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
20 13-11-18/ news/bs-md-co-housing-vote-20l31 1 18_I_housing-project-affoniablc-housing-baltimore-county-council (stating that. community concern ahout the creation of additional affordable housing, with some
residents receiving Section 8 vouchers, would increase crime and lower
property values).
75. Callison, supra note 73, at 257.
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splil), a project gets additional points for going beyond that minimum
by having an even larger proportion of its units be LIHTC eligible. 76
This is in part due to the wording of the Code itself, which states "each
QAP must give preference to projects serving the lowest income tenants for the longest periods of time."77 It is not unusual to have entire developments comprised solely of affordable rent-restricted
units?8 Whereas the program contemplates a potential for mixed-income housing developments with somewhere between 20 and 40 percent of the units designated as affordable, and the rest unrestricted a'5
to incomes and rents, this is hardly ever the case in reality, due to the
competitiveness of yearly tax credit allocation process, where more
points are awarded for projects with higher percentages of LlHTCeligible units. 7!)
This results in the majority of projects in Maryland consisting aflOa
percent affordable housing, turning tax credit developments into de
facto public housing for the working poor (Le., those with incomes
that are sufficiently high to pay the below-market rents, but not so
high as to exceed the applicable percentage of AMI, or who usc a
Section 8 housing voucher to pay the rent). The QAP also dictates
that LIHTC projects must establish a priority for households on the
waiting list for Section 8 assistance, and must make effort to refer potential priority households to the project, which has the potential effect of causing more persons with little to no income to live at the
projects and to frustrate economic integration. so
Only recently has federal law begun requiring the collection of
demographic information on the tenants being served by tax credit
developments. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 requires that properties that receive LIHTCs provide HUD, and HUD
must make publicly available, "data regarding the race, ethnicity, family composition, age, income use of rental assistance, disability status,
and monthly rental payments" of all residents. 8t The hope was that
this data would allow HUD to evaluate the "integrative success of
LIHTC siting" in order to determine whether these projects either
"perpetuate segregation or affirmatively further fair housing."82 However, Congress has not yet appropriated money for the collection of

76. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 62.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(I)(B)(ii).
78. See Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 33, at 660. ("Since the program's inception, over 95 percent of units in projects supported by the program
qualified as low income.").
79. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 61 ("DHCD will award points for income targeting in excess of these minimum requirement~.").
80. [d. at 24.
81. Tegeler et aI., supra note 58, at 58.
82. [d.
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this data, and as of 2013, many states, including Maryland, have not
made this data available to HUD or to the public. 83
B.

The Deuewper's Fee Payment Structure Gives No Incentive to Developers to
Continually Invest in the Properties

Most developers of tax credit properties are for-profit entities. 84 As
Professor Ballard discusses, "For-profit developers of affordable housing grapple with a potential contradiction: On the one hand, a forprofit entity exists in order to create a profit. On the other hand, a
for~profit developer. . .is charged with providing housing for poor
people who likely cannot afford to help for-profit developers generate
excess income."85 The tension between profit and stewardship is exacerbated by QAP provisions that allow a developer to be paid their full
fee during the beginning years of a project's lifespan.
One of the biggest strengths of the program is also one of its biggest
weaknesses: providing units to the lowest income tenants at LIHTG
restricted rent levels does not allow the property to raise rent'> to cover
growing expenses and capital needs as a property ages. Furthermore,
in order to cover the debt service of a property, there is an incentive
to keep rents a high as statutorily allowed while still complying with
the maximum individual requirement of 30 percent of 60 percent of
the AMI, which does not further the federal goal of providing housing
that serves the lowest income tenants. 86 This tension is palpable in
for-profit tax credit deals, for "the program strives to house poor people, but no one so poor that they cannot pay rents sufficient to preserve a profit for the developers."H7 This effectively means creating a
floor on the amount of income that a qualifying person must have in
order to pay rent (i.e., the industry standard of 2 1/2 to 3 times the
amount of rent, and leaves awhole group of people squeezed between
the sides - too well off for public housing, yet too poor to pay for
affordable units that were created to house them).
Furthermore, the way that development fees get paid does not mirror the sort of commitment to affordable housing that the federal
LIHTC program contemplates. 88 The QAP allows property developers to include a maximum of a $2.5 million development fee in the
original financial structure of an affordable housing deal, thereby
drastically increasing the amount of debt on a property while also increasing the LIHTGeligible basis of the project. 89 Curiously, unlike
the mortgage on a property (the repayment of which usually is spread
83. [d.
84. Ballard, supra note 1, at 212.
85. Jd. at 233.
86. 26U.S.C. §42 (m)(I)(B).(ii)(I).
87. Ballard, supra note 1, at 233.
88. See brenerally 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2013).
89. Program Guide, supra note 29, at 35.
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over a period of 20-30 years), or the investors' tax credit benefits
(which are spread over a ten year period), the QAP allows a developer
to withdraw the entire development fee once the construction of the
property is completed - well before the property proves itself financially. Although the development fee may not be paid in full by this
date, the QAP sets the wrong tone by not requiring that some portion
of the development fee be paid during the same ten-year period that
LIHTC benefits accrue to investors. The current fee-withdrawal
schedule does not encourage any substantial accountability on the
part of the developer to put together a deal whose finances are stable
and realistic, and which will produce ca"h flow to support the inevitable physical demands of the building over time, because the developer's priority is to get paid on the front end, well before the realities
of an under-funded property set in.
Furthermore, the QAP enables a developer to compromise a property's financial viability in other ways. For example, a project must
maintain an operating reserve equivalent to three to six months of
operating expenses and debt service payments, which effectively creates a cash-cushion for unforeseen expensesYo However, after one
year, a developer can draw down the operating reserve to pay outstanding developer's fees, as long as the project continues to breakeven during the three-year operating reserve release period. 91
During the first few years of the project's lifespan, there is not a
pressing need for the operating reserve because the physical condition of the property is still relatively new and requires little maintenance. Additionally, the QAP only mandates a replacement reserve of
only $300 per unit per year. This frees up the initial cash flow to balance the finances of the property and, therefore, payout the developer's fee. 92 When the property begins to require significant
reinvestment, ten to 15 years into its life cycle in order to deal with
aging systems such as windows, roofing, plumbing, kitchens, and
baths, the $300 per unit per year replacement reserve may be inadequate to finance major capital expenditures, thereby leaving the property in a vulnerable position.

C.

The Maryland UHTC Program's Focus on New Construction and 40Year Affrrrdability Restrictions Hurt the Ability of the Property to Remain
Financially Healthy

The structure of the QAP program encourages the development of
new affordable housing, but it does not contain adequate provisions
to preserve and maintain the physical condition of existing affordable
housing over the term of the affordability restrictions. The poor fi90. Id. at 32.
91. [d.
92. [d.
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nancial structure of an LIHTC property will eventually lead to less affordable housing, not more. Deferred maintenance will cause
systemic occupancy issues in that property, in turn, causing the property to enter a financial tailspin, losing further rental income necessary to prevent further decline.
Although preservation of existing affordable housing is a stated priority of the QAP, in practice, the QAP favors new construction over
the maintenance of pre-existing stmctures.9~ Only two points out of
forty-six total points are allotted to the preservation of existing affordable housing in the project Scoring Summary Table, highlighting the
low priority the QAP puts on maintaining existing housing on which
affordability restrictions already exist. 94 It is unlikely that an existing
affordable housing property would qualify for financing over a proposal for new construction. This effectively cuts off a necessary source of
funding for affordable housing properties.
Furthermore, Maryland's forty-year affordability restrictions may
frustrate a property owner's ability to obtain conventional refinancing
for better interest rates or renovations to the property, both because
the dearth of cash available to maintain the property has resulted in
its costly physical deterioration and deferred maintenance, and the
pennitted LIHTC rents are restricted as to future increases by HUD
and are not reflective of market rents. 95 Therefore, there is no assurance of increased potential income for the property owner to borrow
against, both because the property's rents cannot increase, even if it
underwent a substantial rehabilitation (as opposed to the private market), and because HUD is not obligated to increase LIHTC rent'i. 9U
This effectively forces the property owner to rely on a limited number
of lenders that are willing to accept the inherent risks associated with
LIHTC properties, or hope that future QAPs will give priority to funding existing LIHTC properties.
V.

Suggestions for Ways to Improve the Program

A.

Amend the Federal Tax Code and the Maryland QAP to Mandate MixedIncome Developments in Order to Increase Racial and Economic
Integration

The primary reason the Code granted individual states the independence to create their own QAPs was so each state could use the tax
credits to further their own individual housing policies and goals. 97
To this end, Maryland's QAP should be amended to reflect the goal of
93. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 17; Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing
and the Role oj the Low lncorM Housing Tax Credit: A ContempOTary Assessment,
57 TAX L\w. 869, 881 (2004).
94. See Program Guide, supra notc 29, at 53.
95. See Ballard, supra note 1, at 235.
96. See id.
97. Smith & Williamson, supm note 21, at 133.
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combating entrenched geographic segregation. In order to decrease
the geographic segregation caused by LIHTC projects, the Code and
Maryland's QAP must both be reformed in order to reflect more diverse siting and occupancy standards, which will allow LIHTC projects
to further fair housing goals.
One reason tax credit developers typically avoid building in suburban areas is because the QAP does not offer the same financial incentives as urban areas (including lower land costs and the ability to be
eligible for additional tax credits),9s One way to combat this is to allow developers in suburban areas to include all or part of the land
costs in their "eligible basis," thereby allowing them to receive some
financial assistance with the higher land costs through the award of
additional LIHTCs. 99 Another way to combat geographic segregation
is to amend the QAP to require a proposed project be in close proximity to better-performing schools, which are included in the QAP's
description of "Communities of Opportunity," i.e. suburban
neighborhoods. lOo
The QAP's scoring criteria should also be amended to cap the proportion of affordable units in a project at fifty percent in order to
ensure that each project constructed has the chance to be a vibrant,
mixed-income community.lOl By amending the Code's provision and
by removing the QAP's bonus points awarded to a project exceeding
traditional affordability proportions (i.e. the 40/60 split), Maryland
can encourage economic desegregation with each new project
built. 102
Additionally, multiple academics advocate that since the tax credits
are originated by the Treasury Department, the Treasury should take
a more active role in ensuring the distribution of LIHTCs "affirmatively furthers" fair housing. lUg This would give the individual states
an additional layer of accountability when amending their QAPs to
reflect the priority of geographic desegregation. In order for the
Treasury to act, it first needs to affirmatively enforce the provisions in
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that mandates the
collection of demographic data from each project receiving
LIHTCs. 104 This would allow the Treasury to create a map of all existing LIHTC projects and require the DHCD to assess how each new
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
Callison, supra note 73, at 255.
See supra note 79 an d accom panyi ng text; Program Guide, supra note 29, at
6l.
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (m)(l)(A) (ii); Program Guide, supra note 29, at 61.
103. See Callison, supra note 73, at 254; Orfield, supra note 19, at 1777; Roisman,
supra note 21, at 1042; Tegeler et al., supra note 58, at 60.
104. Tegeler ct aI., supra note 58, at 58.
98.
99.
100.
] 01.
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project proposal would affect the demographics in its proposed
location. 105
B.

Disburse the Developer's Fee Over a Longer Period of Time so as to Create
Incentive to Continually Invest in the Properties

It is simple to give academic suggestions for how to fix a complicated housing finance program, but that seldom leads to practical
solutions.
This paper suggests the following measures in order to solve the
problem of a developer's fee draining the coffers of a property before
the foreseeable physical needs of the property have been cared for:
1) At least 25% of the developer'S fee should be paid during the ten
year LIHTC period only from cash flOW 10li in excess of the amount
needed to fund 120% of property debt service - longer than the
"break-even" period required by the Program Guide. 107
2) Replacement reserves for each property should be increased at
an annual rate (i.e. 5%) sufficient to build up adequate reserves for
each property when needed in years 11-20.
3) The guarantor of LIHTC compliance during the first fifteen
years should be required to liquet)' some portion of its funding obligation (i.e. 25%) with cash or a letter of credit, which would give it incentive to cause the project to be constructed with more durable
building materials and to monitor maintenance of the project in order to protect against poor marketability of units due to their deteriorated condition.
These changes would most likely narrow down the list of developers
willing to take part in LIHTC projects, but since the yearly LIHTC
allocation competition in Maryland always has more competitors than
available credits, this is a risk worth taking that could be successfully
mitigated. IOH

C.

Create a Framework Where far-Profit and Non-Profit Developers can own
and Operate an Affordable Housing Property in Stages, so that the Property is Ensured Proper Maintenance Over Time

For-profit developers are in this business to make a profit, and providing affordable housing just happens to be the vehicle to accom105. Roisman, supra note 21, at 1042.
106. The Program Guide defines cashflow as property net revenues after payment of all operating expenses and funding all required reseIl'Cs. See Program Guide, supra note 29, at 56.
107. Program Guide, supra note 29, at 31.
108. See 2012 Multifamily Housing Notice 12-12, MD. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND CMIT.
DEV., http://dhcd.maryland.gov/Website/programs/rhf/notices/notice_
12_12.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 20 J3). DHCD received 21 applications and
granted 13 of them in 2012, and in 2011 they received 29 applications [or
LIHTC projects. !d.
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plish that goal. 109 On the other hand, non-profit developers are often
"mission-driven to provide affordable housing" and often have long"
term success managing LIHTC developments years after the initial
fees have been paid out. lIO However, studies have shown that forprofit developers are able to produce a LIHTC unit at a substantially
lower initial cost than non-profit developers. I I I
The profit motive of the for-profit developer can be used as an asset
instead of a liability to the long-term financial health of an affordable
housing project. For-profit developers can get things built, and more
importantly, many for-profit developers are vertically integrated. 112
One company has in-house architects, land developers, contractors,
and lawyers - all of which can streamline the process and keep the
prospective costs of a project down. 1l3 As a compliment to for"profit's
efficiency, non-profits bring a different set of priorities to the table,
priorities that match the long-term physical and financial needs of affordable housing projects.
The logical answer is some sort of cooperative effort: for-profit developers build the property, lease it up, and get it running, and nonprofits step in at year ten to fifteen to purchase the property and run
it for its duration (or longer) .114 This allows the for-profit entity to
continue doing what they do best - developing housing - while nonprofits can provide the sort of commitment and stability that these
existing properties require in order to continue to financially
perform.11 fl
VI.

Conclusion

Providing the right kind of affordable housing to millions of needy
Americans is an important task, one that should be about more than
generating profits. LIHTCs are important to many property developers, for they can be the difference between a project being built and
109. See Smith and Williamson, supra note 21, at 136 ("For-profit owners have a
strong focus on the financial bottom line and aim for maximization of investment returns.").
110. Id.
111. Ballard, supra note 1, at 236. The General Accounting Office estimates that
the average cost of one LlHTC unit built by a for-profit developer is about
$18,000 less than one built by a non-profit developer. U.S. GEN. Ace. OFF.,
TAX CREDITS: REASONS FOR COST DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING BUILT BY FORPROFIT ANO NON-PROFIT DEVELOPERS

I (1999).

112. See Moore, supra note 18, at 1.
113. Id.
114. Ballard, supra note 1, at 237. In contrast to most for-profit developers, nonprofits traditionally maintain higher operating reserves to support sustained low-income use. Id.
115. Although non-profits have employees and costs, just like for-profits, their
directors arc limited in the amount of money that they can withdraw from
the deal at one time (unlike for-profit developers), which typically limit the
non-profit developer's inclination to leave a project financially strapped ill
order to increase personal profits.
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not. Therefore, stricter distribution guidelines should be adopted by
the state to reflect just what a powerful tool tax credits can be. If administered correctly, tax credit~ can be a real force for positive change
in a community, and can serve to develop more than just one project;
they can also sen'e to redevelop a community for generations to come.
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Appendix:
Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development
Multifamily Rental Financing Program Guide Page 53
Scoring Summary Table

Maximum Possible Points

5.1 Capacity of Development Team
5.1.1 Development Team Experience
5.1.2 Deductions from Team Experience Score
5.1.3 Developer Financial Capaci ty
5.1.4 Nonprofits (NPs)

74 Total Points
42 points
. ]0 points
18 points
14 point~

5.2 Community Context
5.2.1 Community Impact Projects
5.2.2 Communities of Opportunity
5.2.3 Transit Oriented Development
5.2.4 Rehab of Existing Properties

28 Total Points
16 points*
16 pOints*
8 points
4 points

5.3 Public Purpose
5.3.1 Income Targeting
5.3.2 Targeted Populations: Non-Elderly PWD
or Special Needs
5.3.3 Family Housing
5.3.4 Tenant Services
5.3.5 Mixed Income Housing
5.3.6 Preseniation of Existing Affordable
Housing

46 Total Points
14 points
10 points

8 points
8 point~
4 points
2 points

5.4 Leveraging and Cost-Effectiveness
5.4.1 Direct Levera!,,, ng
5.4.2 Operating Subsidies
5.4.3 Construction or Rehabilitation Cost
Incentives

20 Total Points
10 points
10 points
- 8 points

5.5 Development Quality
5.5.1 Green Features
5.5.2 Brownfields Redevelopment
5.5.3 Energy and Water Conservation
5.5.4 Site and Building Design

32 Total Points
12 points
1 point
4 points
15 points

5.6 State Bonus Points (maximum oflO
points) #

See note

Total

200

*Project cannot receive points under both CommuniLy Impact and Communities of
Opportunity categories.
#Statt;; Bonus Points may be awarded outside of the 200 point scale

